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Abstract
Observing that most social networks are clustered, the literature often argues that
agents are more willing to form links that close triangles. We challenge this idea by
proposing a simple model of new collaboration formation that shows why network
clustering may arise even though agents do not “like” network closure. We address
empirically this question on the longitudinal evolution of the French co-invention
network, and find that two inventors are less likely to form a first research collabo-
ration when they have common partners. Our findings further reveal the preferences
of inventors towards forming non-redundant connections.
Keywords: Social networks; Link formation; Closure; Patents; Conditional logit;
Monte Carlo simulations.
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1 Introduction
One of the main salient features of most real social and economic networks is that
they are highly clustered, in the sense that the neighborhoods of neighbors tend to
overlap, exhibiting what Rapoport (1953) and Granovetter (1973) first called “tri-
adic closure”. In other words, agents having a common friend or partner are highly
likely to be friends or partners themselves, so that the whole network typically in-
corporates far more triangles than would be obtained by chance. This property has
been observed in a variety of network contexts, such as those involving Hollywood
actors (Watts, 1999), corporate board members (Davis et al., 2003), Broadway mu-
sicians (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005), inventors (Fleming et al., 2007; Carayol and Roux,
2008), scientists (Newman, 2001) and alliances between firms (Kogut and Walker,
2001; Baum et al., 2003).
A direct and natural explanation of the social tendency for closure is based
on a individuals’ presumed preference for closing triangles, what we call the love-
for-triadic-closure hypothesis. This idea was first suggested by Simmel (1922), then
followed by Heider (1958) and Newcomb (1961), who explored the psychological mo-
tives of individuals to maintain a “cognitive balance” between their social relations.
Later, sociologists, management scholars and more recently economists, have em-
phasized the benefits of network closure in social relations. Coleman (1988) argues
that closure, by facilitating collective monitoring and sanctions, prevents free-riding
and enforces cooperative behavior. Granovetter (1985) highlights the fact that clo-
sure facilitates interpersonal trust, since it creates a reputation cost for individuals
who misbehave. Common relations play the role of social collateral which favors the
formation of relations in a high-value exchange environment (Karlan et al., 2009).
A common partner may also act as a referee between his or her acquaintances (e.g.
Granovetter, 1973; Burt and Knez, 1995; Fafchamps et al., 2010). Accordingly, the
perceived gains of a new relationship between two agents will be higher if they have
common partners.
The empirical literature challenges this rationale, however, as it documents mixed
effects of closure on economic performances or social achievements. In particular,
whereas they generally expect a positive effect of closure on the inventive perfor-
mances of various actors, studies on research collaboration networks are inconclusive
as these effects are either positive, non significant or even negative (e.g. Reagans
and Mc Evily, 2003; Schilling and Phelps, 2007; Fleming et al., 2007; Bettencourt
et al., 2007; Breschi and Lenzi, 2016). A lively debate also concerns the effect
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of (generational or inter-generational) closure on children’s school performances or
well-being. Famous studies are those of Coleman et al. (1982), Carbonaro (1999)
and Morgan and Sorensen (1999) who obtain an opposite effect of parents’ closure
on school achievements. Similarly, contradictory effects are obtained regarding the
effect of closure on diffusion. For instance, the findings of Ugander et al. (2012)
suggest that closure in virtual networks is a negative predictor of Facebook dif-
fusion, while the opposite effect is found by Centola (2010) on the adoption of a
health forum. A number of studies also report in various contexts an inverse-U
shape relation between closure and, among others, the probability of artistic success
of Broadway musicals (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005), team effectiveness (Oh et al., 2004),
or new technology-based venture performance (Wang and Chen, 2016).
Rather than making the assumption that agents “like” closure, an alternative
point of departure would be that contextual factors or homophily may influence net-
work formation and ultimately lead to closed networks. It has often been claimed
in the sociological literature that people tend to form links with others who are
similar to them (in terms of age, education, ethnicity, religious beliefs for instance)
or share some common neighborhoods, such as a school or company (see McPherson
et al., 2001 for an extensive review). In fact, such factors could raise the level of
clustering in real networks as people with similar or close characteristics to others
may form cliques together (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010). Therefore, it is not nec-
essary to assume love-for-triadic-closure to explain clustered networks. In theory,
it is even possible to simultaneously reject the love-for-triadic-closure hypothesis,
introduce a love-for-non-redundant-connections ingredient and still observe a high
level of triadic closure.
To see this point, consider for instance the connections model introduced by
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In this model, agents benefit from positive external-
ities from other agents with whom they are indirectly connected, and the strength
of the externality declines with social distance. As only the length of the short-
est paths matters, agents do not benefit from multiple paths to some other agent.
Therefore, when two agents already have at least one common friend, they have
fewer incentives to form a link with each other, ceteris paribus, because thanks
to this common neighbor, they already benefit from each other. In this network
formation model, equilibrium networks will typically not exhibit a high level of clus-
tering. However, introducing an exogenous structure (geography for instance) that
affects direct link costs in this model is sufficient to ensure that agents form triadic
connections (Carayol and Roux, 2009). Though the gross returns of those redun-
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dant connections are limited, agents form and maintain them simply because their
costs are also very low. Many triangles could therefore be observed in real social
networks, even though agents do not particularly like them. Socially distant (non-
redundant) connections are more valuable but in the same time more costly because
they need to be formed with (geographically) distant agents. There are only a few
such social bridges because their formation dissipates the incentives to further form
similar connections.1 This view is consistent with the literature highlighting that
individuals who bridge separate clusters (usually named brokers) experience higher
performance, for instance in tracking job opportunities (Granovetter, 1974), ob-
taining promotions (Burt, 1997), generating good ideas (Burt, 2004), or enhancing
firms’ performances (Zaheer and Bell, 2005) or inventiveness (Ahuja, 2000; Baum
et al., 2000).2 Yet, bridges are expected to provide opportunities for individuals or
organizations to benefit from new information or ideas arising from disconnected
parts of the network (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 2000; Letterie et al., 2008).
In this paper, we empirically challenge the ideas that love-for-triadic-closure
and/or love-for-non-redundant-connections may drive the formation of new collabo-
rations. These hypotheses are tested on the formation of collaboration ties between
individual inventors. More specifically, we estimate the formation of links in a large
co-invention network.3 Such networks are particularly well suited to test our hy-
potheses for several reasons. First, we were able to build a dataset on a large scale
networks which we observe longitudinally over a sufficiently long period of time.
Further, this dataset has been matched with companies data sets in order to use
interesting covariates on top of other covariates built using information contained
in the patents. The second reason is that the formation of collaborations between
inventors remains understudied since previous studies in the field have mainly consid-
ered network ties as exogenous. Moreover, the results obtained concerning network
effects on inventive productivity remain contradictory in the literature in particular
regarding the effects of closure (Schilling and Phelps, 2007; Fleming et al., 2007;
Bettencourt et al., 2007; Breschi and Lenzi, 2016). A deeper understanding of how
collaborative ties are formed should provide new insights for empirical research to
1Carayol and Roux (2009) show that strategically-formed long-run equilibrium networks are
closed locally, though a few bridges between separate communities are formed, thereby constituting
small worlds, in the sense of Watts and Strogatz (1998).
2Note that these networks, like other social networks, typically exhibit a high level of clustering
(i.e. triadic closure).
3A link is drawn between two individuals if they have previously co-invented at least one patent.
The procedure is similar to that for drawing scientific collaboration networks from data on the co-
authorship of scientific publications (Newman, 2001; Baraba´si et al., 2002; Fafchamps et al., 2010).
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consider those effects4 and should ultimately better ground policy recommendations.
We first design a very simple heuristic model which clarifies the relation between
network gains and link formation. In our model, agents (individual researchers),
at any point in time, may consider the formation of a bilateral collaboration that
will produce an expected direct return and generate various costs.5 If this research
collaboration is undertaken, a new social tie is formed within the larger social net-
work generated by preexisting collaborations. These connections are conducive to
externalities. Though the model has intentionally been kept as simple as possible,
it is sufficiently general to encompass opposing assumptions about triadic closure.
Either direct and indirect links to an agent are complementary and then agents typ-
ically like forming triangles, or they are partial or perfect substitutes, which implies
that agents do not care about forming triangles, or even dislike doing so. Simulta-
neously, the model allows us to test whether two agents are more likely to become
connected when that new link grants access to agents they do no yet benefit from
directly (non-redundant links). This leads to a simple and generic expression of the
incentive schemes for forming collaborations at any point in time, either in or out of
equilibrium. As such, this expression can be applied to different contexts of network
formation.
We use relational information contained in all European patent applications over
the period 1978-2004, for which at least one inventor has declared a personal ad-
dress in France. Once we have disambiguated inventor identities thanks to an orig-
inal Bayesian methodology, we obtain a population of about one hundred thousand
inventors and reliable individual information on them, such as their precise geo-
graphic location, technological specialization or patent applicant identities (mostly
companies in the EPO system). These applicants are matched against the list of
French companies in mandatory annual surveys to gather detailed information on
applicants, including their yearly R&D investments and research personnel. We sus-
pect that the omission of some (potentially time-varying) variables could lead to the
mistaken conclusion that agents have incentives to form triadic connections. This
is likely to occur if, in the true data generation process, these covariates affect both
4For instance, though we would expect non-redundant connections to be very important to
access fresh ideas in such professional networks, Lee (2010) find that individual fixed effect may in
fact explain both the formation of distant connections and inventor performance. He then shows
that controlling for inventor fixed effects, the position-performance correlation disappears.
5In our model, each agent can create a new collaboration with any other existing agent. This
network formation mechanism is then different from the ones where new connections can only be
ensured by new agents entering the network, as in Baraba´si and Albert (1999), Jackson and Rogers
(2007) or more recently Ko¨nig (2016).
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the probability of connecting and the probability of having common friends in the
same way. The main variables we have in mind are the geographical distances be-
tween inventors, the institutional barriers they may face or the existence of common
research interests, which should affect the opportunities and costs of forming links
and be simultaneously correlated with closure. Their influence on knowledge flows
between workers, scientists or inventors has already been evidenced in a number of
papers (e.g. Kogut and Zander, 1992; Jaffe et al., 1993; Fafchamps et al., 2010 ;
Lee, 2010).
We rely on conditional logit regressions which allow us to control for such dyadic
fixed effects to estimate the probability of two as yet unconnected agents forming
a first connection at any period of time. The identification of the main explaining
variable effects thus comes from their variation in time. As this may bias estimates,
explaining variables are detrended (Allisson and Christakis, 2006; Fafchamps et al.,
2010). To account for the interdependence between dyads emanating from the same
person, inference is based on dyadic-robust standard errors (see Fafchamps and
Gubert, 2007 and Cameron and Miller 2014). Importantly, we introduce a dyadic
fixed effect that accounts for the time-invariant matching quality of the two agents,
as well as for the invariant individual abilities of the two inventors.6
When the connection costs are not properly accounted for, our estimations lead
to the conclusion that agents like closing triangles. But since we account for these
costs, the closure effect disappears. According to our preferred specification, agents
are even 23% less likely to collaborate when they have one more common previ-
ous collaborator. This speaks against the love-for-triadic-closure hypothesis. Our
second result is that inventors are more likely to collaborate when they each have
more partners with whom the other is not already connected to. If agents of a given
dyad have one standard deviation of non-common partners more, they are 20% more
likely to become connected. This supports the love-for-non-redundant connections
hypothesis in the context of knowledge creation. Such findings appear to be globally
robust to different assumptions about the trend of the quantitative explaining vari-
ables (logarithmic or quadratic vs. linear), to a larger time-window used for building
network variables (ten-year vs. five-year), and to different methods for clustering
standard errors (two-way vs. dyadic).
6In a recent paper, Graham (2016) introduces a methodology to disentangle closure effects from
other homophily effects in network formation. The identification strategy hinges on dyads creating
or severing a link together while all their other connections as well as their neighbors’ connections
remain stable across time. Unfortunately this method is very demanding in terms of network data
and cannot be used on our dataset since only a handful of stable dyads are present.
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Finally, we conduct a series of Monte Carlo simulations to investigate the con-
sequences of departing from implicit assumptions of the econometric model. In
particular, as meetings can not be observed, we do not know if some dyads remain
unconnected because agents have met but decided not to collaborate, or if they did
not meet. We show that this may lead to a downward bias in magnitude for our
network variables. We also explore the consequences of assuming a different meet-
ing process, continuous updating of the network, and mistakes in the identification
of agents. Monte Carlo simulations overall reinforce the conclusion that no love-
for-triadic-closure is at play in our data and even further suggest that the “true”
negative effect on triadic closure in network formation may even be underestimated.
The following section introduces the heuristic theoretical model of strategic
research collaboration formation, and our empirical strategy. The third section
presents the data. The fourth section describes our findings and investigates sev-
eral robustness checks. In Section 5, we discuss the results of the Monte Carlo
experiments. The last section concludes and outlines some managerial and policy
implications of our findings.
2 The formation of inter-individual research col-
laboration networks
In this section, we present the different building blocks of a simple theoretical model
which illustrates how individual expected returns from collaboration shape link-
forming strategies. This model leads to a reduced form equation specifying agents’
incentives to bilaterally form collaborations. Lastly, we show how this equation can
be tested empirically and how it relates to our hypotheses on triadic closure and
non-redundant connections.
2.1 The setup
At each period t of the discrete time, we consider a finite set of nt agents, N t =
{1, 2, ..., nt}. New agents may enter the population at the beginning of any period
and, for the sake of simplicity in the exposition, agents are assumed never to retire
or die,7 so that N t ⊆ N t+1. A (non-directed) link between two distinct agents i and
j ∈ N t is denoted ij. Let gt denote the relational network in place at the beginning
7This assumption could easily be relaxed without changing any of the predictions.
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of period t, that is the collection of all existing links at that point in time. We also
assume that agents never consider link deletion, so that gt ∈ gt+1. At the beginning
of each period, all pairs of unconnected agents simultaneously meet with some given
uniform small probability p. They may then decide bilaterally to establish research
collaboration or not on the basis of the perceived impact of the new link on the
discounted net present value of their payoffs. Finally, agents are myopic, in the
sense that they do not anticipate the impact of their present moves on subsequent
moves: they consider that the network formed in the present period is a permanent
one. This standard assumption is usually considered as relevant when one considers
large networks in which forward-looking computations become extremely complex.
2.2 Individual payoffs
A research project generates immediate (pair specific) net payoffs, and brings a
social connection into the web of already existing connections, which also generates
per period returns. Let us assume that the expected (net) returns for i of a shared
research project with j formed at period t is given simply by:
rt(i, j) = θij + ε
t
ij − ζctij, (1)
where the net returns of the research collaboration are composed of: i) θij, an
idiosyncratic, pair-specific and time-invariant parameter, of ii) εtij a noise interpreted
as the opportunities of research collaboration between i and j that particular year,
and of ctij which captures the (sunk) time-variant costs and benefits, supported by
i, for running the research collaboration with j at period t. ζ is a non-null and
positive parameter so that variable ctij is interpreted as a net cost. To simplify the
exposition of the model, though that is not necessary for our results, we will further
assume that θij = θji, ε
t
ij = ε
t
ji and c
t
ij = c
t
ji so that r
t(i, j) = rt(j, i), namely the net
primary payoffs of a research collaboration, are identical for the two agents involved.
Research collaboration between two agents who are not already connected con-
sists in a bilateral social connection that is assumed to be permanent for reasons of
simplicity. The complex of bilateral social connections is also assumed to support
positive externalities at each period. We propose the following simple specification
of these “network” (per unit of time) payoffs:
pii
(
gt
)
=
∑
j 6=i
(
αηij
(
gt
)
+ βη2ij
(
gt
)
+ γ
4
η ij
(
gt
))
, (2)
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with ηij (g
t) the number of direct links between i and j on gt (equal to 0 or 1),
η2ij (g
t) the number of paths of length two between i and j on gt, provided there is
no direct link, between i and j, and
4
η ij (g
t) the number of triangles on gt having i
and j as summits.8
The two parameters α and β are likely to be positive. A standard interpretation
for these parameters would be that they capture the imperfect knowledge spillovers
that flow through local connections: α scales the knowledge spillover from a direct
neighbor, β gives the spillover that flows through any path of length two from
some other, provided there is no direct link to that agent. Parameter γ scales the
externality captured by i for each indirect connection of length two to any direct
neighbor. It captures both possible knowledge spillover flowing on such a path, and
a closure effect. As such, it is also expected to be positive.
It should be noted that, according to this payoff specification, agents are assumed
only to consider social network externalities at a social distance less than or equal
to two. This is a natural assumption for the closure effect, but needs to be justified
for the knowledge spillover effect. One convincing justification for not considering
knowledge flows at distances strictly greater than two is provided by Singh (2005)
and Breschi and Lissoni (2006), who show that the probability of patent citations
decreases sharply in function of the social distance between patent inventors, and
that these spillovers are null or nearly null at a social distance equal to or greater
than three. It should also be noted that externalities are here associated with paths,
and not agents. Therefore, one agent may benefit from another agent via different
paths, the total gain from that second agent being additive to the gain from each
path.
2.3 Bilateral incentives to form connections
We now focus on the bilateral incentives to form connections, once two unconnected
agents have just met (which is supposed to be random for simplicity). For simplicity,
agents are assumed to be able to bargain bilaterally when they consider forming a
link together, so that a link will be formed between two agents who meet, if their
expected joint payoffs are greater when the project is launched.9 Therefore, the total
8That is also the number of common neighbors of i and j, or the number of paths of length 2
between i and j, provided there is a direct link between i and j.
9We do not consider the precise way in which agents bargain, but just assume that the bilateral
transfers are such that the link is always formed when the two agents find it jointly profitable to
do so. This assumption allows us to consider the formation of a link as a joint dyadic decision,
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variation of expected worth for the two agents, due to the creation of a new link
between them, constitutes the (dyadic) incentives to form connections, whatever the
effective bilateral transfers they operate. Let ∆(gt, ij) denote the variation in the
discounted payoffs of agents i and j if link ij is created while the network gt is in
place (with ij /∈ gt). Using Equations 1 and 2, this is given by:
∆(gt, ij) = 2
(
θij + ε
t
ij − ζctij
)
(3)
+
1
1− δ
(
2α + βη¯ij
(
gt
)
+ (4γ − 2β)4η ij
(
gt + ij
))
,
with η¯ij (g
t) the number of non-common neighbors of i and j on gt,10 and with
4
η ij(g
t)
the number of common neighbors of i and j defined above.11 The first component
of the right-hand side of Equation 3 is related to the per period average joint gain
of the research collaboration. The second one captures the net present value of the
variation in the flow of network payoffs, due to the new link ij having been added
to gt. All the agents discount time by factor δ. The variation in the per period
payoffs is composed of the payoffs obtained thanks to: two new direct relations,
η¯ij (g
t) new indirect relations between agents not having a direct link, 4
4
η ij (g
t + ij)
new indirect relations between agents having a direct link, and 2
4
η ij (g
t + ij) less
indirect relations between agents having no direct link on gt. The following example
illustrates how exactly these computations are made.
Example 1 Let us consider the network g = {ix, jx, iv, iu, iy, yj, js} depicted in
Figure 1, and let us focus on the potential formation of a new link between agents
i and j that does not exist in g. It should be noted that here, η¯ij (g) = 3,
4
η ij(g +
ij) = 2. Thus, according to Equation 3, the new link ij would bring to the dyad
an expected average net payoff of (1− δ) [∆(g, ij)] = 2 (1− δ) [θij + εtij − ζcij] +
[2α + 3β + 2 (4γ − 2β)]. Let us explain the second term of the right-hand side of
this equation, which corresponds to the variation in the per period network payoffs.
instead of two separate decisions. It is consistent with the idea that in research collaboration, not
all agents contribute equally: more peripheral agents often accept to contribute more to a project,
which materializes here as a bilateral transfer. Since agents do not consider the further moves
induced by their present collaboration, the transfers are rationally limited to the private returns
generated by the link. Agents are, however, not allowed to subsidize the formation of a link they
are not directly involved in, which is also a reasonable behavioral assumption.
10That is, agents in the direct neighborhood of i (j), but from which the other agent j (i) does
not already benefit (at a social distance strictly greater than two).
11It should be noted that, by definition: η¯ij (g
t) + 2
4
η ij(g
t + ij) = ηi (g
t) + ηj (g
t) , where ηi (g
t)
denotes the number of neighbors of agent i in gt.
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The dyad first enjoys the returns of two new direct connections (j with i and i
with j), each providing an α. Thanks to link ij, i benefits from the returns of four
indirect connections, provided there is a direct link: two that point to j ({ix, xj},
and {iy, yj}), one that goes to x ({ij, jx}), and one to y ({ij, jy}). Simultaneously,
two indirect connections, provided there is no direct link, have disappeared ({ix, xj},
and {iy, yj}) on g+ ij. The same occurs for j, which explains the multiplication by
two.
2.4 Network evolution and empirical strategy
The relational network emerges gradually from the uniform meeting process exposed
above and the willingness of agents to form links.12 At each period of time, with
the network gt being in place, and provided that the link between i and j does not
already exist, the probability of a dyadic connection being established between the
two agents is written Pr(gt+1ij = 1|gt, gtij = 0). As explained above, at each period,
any pair of unconnected agents i, j ∈ N t is chosen randomly with a given constant
and a non-null probability p and, provided that two agents i and j meet, a link will
be formed between them if ∆(gt, ij) > 0. We further assume that εtij ∼ Logit, and
we denote F (.) its associated cumulative distribution function. The probability of i
and j forming a collaboration in period t is thus given by:
Pr
(
ij ∈ gt+1 ∣∣ij /∈ gt ) = Pr(∆(gt, ij) > 0)× p ∝ F (∆¯(gt, ij)), (4)
with ∆¯(gt, ij) ≡ ∆(gt, ij) − εtij. We propose to estimate Equation 4 by relying on
the following specification of the incentives to form a bilateral collaboration:
1
2
∆(gt, ij) = β1 + β
ncηij
(
gt
)
+ βc
4
η ij
(
gt + ij
)
+ θij + ε
t
ij + β
costctij, (5)
where θij is the time-invariant fixed effect, and ε
t
ij the error term. This expression
is directly derived from our specification of the bilateral payoffs of a link formation
exposed in Equation 3, with β1 =
α
(1−δ) , β
nc = β
2(1−δ) , β
c = 2γ−β
1−δ and β
cost = −ζ.
If 2γ < β, then βc > 0, and thus the number of triangles impact positively the
12The social network is not assumed to be at equilibrium but in some possibly transient state. In
our context, new agents enter the population at all periods, and connection costs evolve over time.
Therefore, to assume that the network is at equilibrium would amount to considering that agents
could rearrange all their collaborations at each period, which would obviously not be consistent.
Carayol and Roux (2008) adopt the alternative perspective by studying inert components, assuming
that they reach some stable state.
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incentives to form a link. If it turns out to be positive and significant, this would
mean that agents like closing triangles, thus supporting the love-for-triadic-closure
hypothesis. We will also be concerned with βnc being positive and significant, which
would provide support for the love-for-non-redundant-connections hypothesis, in line
with the idea that the collaboration network is a vehicle for knowledge spillovers.
Turning to the costs of research collaboration formation, we will identify several
factors that may impact the probability of forming a connection. Several forms of
homophily affect such costs in terms of uncertainty, time and effort to form a link.
3 Data and variables
Our primary empirical evidence is built upon all European patent applications in
which at least one inventor has declared an address in France, and the priority date
of which is between January 1978 and December 2004 included. All non-French
inventors of these patents have been excluded. Before describing the co-invention
network and the various explanatory variables, we first describe the procedure we
developed to disambiguate inventors, a major issue when tackling large network data
based on administrative files.
3.1 A Bayesian methodology to disambiguate inventors’ names
For each inventor listed in a patent document, her/his name, first name and personal
address information are available, but a unique identification is not. This raises a
disambiguation issue, or a “name game”, according to Trajtenberg et al. (2006), due
to the homonymy of inventors and to spelling errors. Most often, such errors should
not be neglected, since an accumulation of small identity errors could easily trigger
great changes in the network data. For instance, a Type 1 error of homonymy would
lead to considering that different persons are the same, thereby mistakenly generat-
ing some apparently extremely connected agents creating unjustified links between
different communities. A Type 2 error of homonymy would lead to ignoring the role
of bridging agents. As is well known in the literature on networks, many network
statistics are very sensitive to such errors. Therefore, the use of the information
on patent inventors necessitates the correct identification of individual identities in
patent data through some reliable, systematic and reproducible methodology.
Though a growing literature tackling this issue is emerging,13 a widely accepted
13For an overview see Migue´lez and Gomez-Migue´lez (2011), Pezzoni et al. (2014) and Li et al.
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standard has not yet been fixed, and a whole range of more or less ad hoc tech-
niques can be seen. Any disambiguation procedure needs, in particular, to have a
filtering step, in which different observable attributes, already listed in the patent
dataset, are used to provide similarity scores to determine whether two homonyms
refer to one and the same person. Two main issues need to be addressed. First, how
much should similarity scores increase when two homonyms have the same modality
for some given variable? Should, for instance, information about the city of resi-
dence contribute more or less to the similarity scores than information about the
technological classes? Second, how should the relative frequencies of each variable
modality be taken into account? Clearly, it is not as informative to observe that
two homonyms live in Paris as in a small town, and we would like to know what
difference this makes exactly.
We have thus developed a Bayesian methodology for estimating the probabil-
ity that two homonyms are the same person, given a series of observables provided
by the data. This methodology, further detailed in Appendix A,14 addresses the
two main issues stressed above. Out of 133,764 patents considered, we find 262,186
patent×inventor occurrences that correspond to an address in France. We use the
following list of observable attributes of individuals: name and first name, address
(the full string and the extracted name of the city), technological class, patent cita-
tion, applicant (at company and group level). Our methodology also makes use of an
empirical benchmark of nearly five thousand reliable (positive or negative) matches.
We thus know that we were able to reach ninety-eight percent correct inferences out
of a linear combination of Type 1 and Type 2 errors in the benchmark. Out of a
total initial population of 126,887 agents, we obtain 103,309 French inventors.
3.2 The French co-invention network
Of those 103, 309 French inventors, 82, 994 invented a patent with at least one other
French inventor over the period 1978-2004. In the evolving co-invention network,
connection exists if two persons have already invented at least one patent together.
Implicitly, we assume that all inventors of a patent are personally acquainted. This
assumption, which is standard in the literature on co-authorship networks (see e.g.
Newman, 2004; Moody, 2004; Goyal et al., 2006), is even more acceptable in the
co-invention context, since co-invented patents (with at least two inventors) mostly
(2014).
14Even more details are available in a technical note written by two of us (Carayol and Cassi,
2009), on the same data set, but less updated.
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involve small teams of collaborators: the average and median numbers of inventors
of co-invented patents are respectively 2.8 and 2, with a standard deviation equal
to only 1.19. Different assumptions can be made about the duration of a link. As
is usually done in the literature (e.g. Singh, 2005), we will mostly rely here upon
a five-year backward-moving window. However, we have also computed network
data on an alternative ten-year moving window, and for the cumulated network.
Table 1 provides some basic statistics for each of these three networks in the last
year of our sample (2004). As could be expected, the number of connected agents
changes according to the assumption made about link duration. Note that the largest
component of the cumulated network represents 50% of the whole population (62% of
the connected agents). As a point of comparison, the largest component of scientific
co-authorship networks rarely includes less than 70% of the population.15 Such a
discrepancy may be explained by a greater density of the co-authorship networks.16
One could also argue that technological knowledge may be more fragmented than
scientific knowledge, or that the institutional configuration could generate a higher
fragmentation of the population of inventors than authors, who evolve in a more open
scientific mode of knowledge production. A very interesting statistic for our study
is the average clustering coefficient. This gives the (averaged among all connected
agents) number of triangles to be found in agents’ neighborhoods, divided by the
number of all the triangles that could be built between these neighbors. We find
high values for average clustering (between 53 and 59%), a result which is very close
to those usually found in large social networks.
3.3 Variables
We now present the variables that will be used in the regressions. They include
network variables, geographical and technological distances directly extracted from
patent data, and applicant data that rely both on the cleaning of the applicant field
of patent data and the match of patent applicants with companies in mandatory
national surveys.
Descriptive statistics on all variables are presented in Table 2. Since the fixed
effect approach we use in our econometric estimations deletes all dyads with only
15See, for instance, Newman (2001) where a 5-year window is taken into account, and Baraba´si
et al. (2002) where the data cover a 8-year period.
16It is a well-known property of both random and scale-free networks that increasing network
density leads non-linearly to the emergence of a “giant component” tending to encompass almost
all the population (Erdos and Renyi, 1960).
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null-dependent variables (no link is ever formed), the data are limited to the yearly
observations of the dyads that are eventually formed. Moreover, since the variability
in the explanatory variables comes from the observation of at least one previous
patent, we only consider the 97, 551 dyads in which an inventor has already invented
at least one patent. Each one of these dyads is observed starting from the first year
the two concerned agents are considered to be part of the population of inventors,17
until the link is formed (that year being included). These dyads involve 54, 886
distinct inventors. All in all, there are 407, 001 dyad×year observations.
3.3.1 Network variables
The dependent variable gt+1ij is a dummy, equal to one if the link between the two
active agents i and j is formed in year t+ 1, and zero otherwise. This concerns the
period 1983-2004. For each year t during the period 1982-2003,18 we calculated the
two explaining variables of major interest on the 5-year window network gt, namely
the number of non-common neighbors ηij (g
t) and the number of common neighbors
4
η ij (g
t).19 We also computed a series of network controls (noted net controlstij)
that concerns the time-variant network attributes of inventors of each focal dyad:
the average number of patents per year of the two agents, the rate of difference
(absolute value of the difference divided by the mean) of agents’ degree and the rate
of difference in their average number of patents.
3.3.2 Geographical and technological distances
As patent data mention the personal addresses of inventors, we were able to locate
inventors in the Metropolitan France area by matching the post codes mentioned
in their addresses with their corresponding latitude and longitude coordinates.20
By means of name disambiguation, we were able to identify inventors who changed
location: as many as 11, 970 of the connected inventors declared at least two different
17In order to build the unbalanced panel data set, we had to formulate some assumption about
the entry of inventors into the population. An inventor is considered as active three years before
his first patent application year.
18There is a one-year lag for all explanatory variables compared with the dependent variable, as
suggested by our theoretical framework.
19The five-year window was used, since it is the one most commonly employed in similar empirical
network studies. However, a larger ten-year window will also be used to build the right-hand side
network variables in the robustness check analyses. By doing so, we lose five years of observation
and the period covered is 1988-2004 for the dependent variable and 1987-2003 for the explanatory
variables.
20Those coordinates were kindly provided to us by the IGN (Institut Ge´ographique National).
14
addresses. Most geographically mobile inventors remain in the same area: nearly
79% (86%) of mobile inventors have a maximal distance between their different
locations of less than 20 km (50 km).
The Euclidean geographical distance can be computed for any pair of addresses,
given their coordinates (latitude and longitude). Since some agents change location,
more than one distance may be associated with a pair of connected agents: some
pairs of agents invent together on several occasions, while at least one of the two
changes addresses in the meanwhile. If we restrict ourselves to our data set of dyads,
matters are much simpler. Overall, we have identified more than 145, 000 distances
(in kilometers) between co-inventors. If we just consider the distance for the year in
which the link is formed, we observe that the distribution of connections, according
to the geographic distance between agents, is very skewed. More than 63% of the
connections are achieved between inventors that live less than 50 km from each other,
while fewer than 6.2% of the connections are formed between agents who live more
than 550 km from each other. Figure 2 presents the histogram of the geographic
distance between inventors, restricted to the dyadic observations of the year when
the link is formed. The variable geotij, which is equal to twice the geographic distance
(as suggested by the theoretical model) between agents i and j at period t, accounts
for some of the connection costs.
For each pair of inventors, in each year, we also computed the technological
distance. This has been defined using the similarity measurement proposed by
Jaffe (1988), i.e. un-centered correlation measurement of two inventors’ distribution
vector of patents over 30 technological IPC classes defined by OST (2010). It is
given by :
jaffetij = 1−
∑
k n
k,t
i n
k,t
j((∑
k
(
nk,ti
)2)∑
k
(
nk,tj
)2)1/2 ,
with nk,ti the number of patents i invented in technological class k before year t.
Our results are invariant when we use alternative measurements of technological
distance, such as the Euclidean or Manhattan distance which are very correlated
together and with Jaffe distance (coefficients above .97).21
21Estimations are not included due to space constraints but are available from the authors.
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3.3.3 Applicants
The association of inventors to applicants on a yearly basis was based on the two
following principles: i) the inventor is associated with her/his first applicant and per-
manently if she/he does not switch to another applicant; ii) if the inventor switches
to a new applicant, she/he is associated with that new applicant from the year of
the application of the new patent.
To account for the institutional costs of collaboration, a dummy variable apptij
was created: it is equal to unity if i and j have ever been associated with the
same applicant. We also identify public research institutions (universities and other
public bodies) among all the applicants of our database. This variable is of interest
for us since we hypothesize that, when inventors are in the academic sphere, they
may follow different behavioral patterns, somewhat reducing the perceived costs
of collaborations. A simple justification would be that academics are less likely
to perceive each other as competitors and are therefore more likely to be willing
to engage in joint research projects. The dummy variable acadtij captures this: it
is equal to unity if the two agents have already invented a patent for which the
applicant is a public research institution. About eleven percent of all dyads formed
are between academics.
A final step in the enrichment of our data proceeded as follows. We matched
the patent dataset with the French R&D surveys conducted annually by the French
Ministry of Research, using the name and location of applicants-companies as the
matching key. These surveys are exhaustive for all the companies employing at
least one full-time researcher (whatever their size) and provided us with annual
data on companies’ internal and external R&D expenditure, number of researchers,
as well as more general information, such as total number of employees. We then
deflated internal and external R&D expenditure by a national investment price
index. Information concerning the applicants associated with the inventors was
used to build dyadic variables (denoted app controlstij), both by summing for the two
agents and by calculating the rate of difference (the absolute values of the difference
within the dyad divided by the sum). Though the company surveys we used are
exceptionally extensive, it was not possible to obtain this information for every
applicant in the dyad, or for every year. This results from a sharp decrease in the
number of observations available: approximately 130,000 observations for all dyadic
sums, and approximately 93,000 observations for all the relative differences within
the dyad (which can not be calculated when the sum is null). Since such a massive
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reduction in the number of observations sharply decreases coefficient significance,
we decided to present only the results in which applicant controls are limited to
dyadic sums.22
4 Estimations and results
The direct empirical counterpart of the theoretical model described in Equations 4
and 5, is given in the following equation:
Pr
(
ij ∈ gt+1 ∣∣ij /∈ gt ) = F (β1 + βncηij (gt)+ βc4η ij (gt)+ βcost1 geotij + βcost2 jaffetij
+βcost3 app
t
ij + β
cost
4 acad
t
ij + β
cost
5 app controls
t
ij + β
cost
6 net controls
t
ij + θij
)
.
(6)
The significance and signs of parameters βnc and βc are our main interest, provided
that we control properly for the direct benefits and costs of collaboration forma-
tion. To do so, we introduced a fixed effect θij that accounts for the time-invariant
matching quality of the two agents which, we hypothesize, corresponds to the re-
turns of the research collaboration between i and j captured by these two agents.
That term accounts for any time-invariant effect on the probability of connecting,
such as the individual abilities of i and j. Controlling for time-invariant fixed effect
is, however, not sufficient since there may be some time-variant factors that affect
the probability of collaboration. Four variables introduced above account for the
costs: geographic distance (geotij) between agents, technological distance (jaffe
t
ij),
having already invented for the same applicant (apptij) which we interpret as being
associated with the same institution, and having already invented for an academic
institution (acadtij) that may capture more collaborative research patterns.
Lastly, we included two series of controls: app controlstij and net controls
t
ij. The
former refer to the research capacity of the applicant(s) associated with the inventors
of the dyad. This series includes the total internal and external R&D expenditure,
the number of researchers and the number of employees, as well as the difference
rates of these three variables between the two agents of the dyad. This information
is however available only for one subset of the whole sample.23 The second series of
22We have found that the decrease in significance can be attributed mainly to the sample re-
duction and not to the inclusion of more controls by running all model regressions on the only
observations that are fully informed.
23For the dyads in which link formation is assessed thanks to a patent for which the applicant
is found in the company data.
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controls concerns inventors’ time-variant network attributes: the average number of
patents per year of the two agents, the rate of difference in the degree of the agents,
and the rate of difference in their average number of patents. These variables allow
us to control, in particular, for the time-varying individual propensities to patent
(which may affect the meeting probability p that is assumed to be uniform across
dyads in the model).24
Our estimation strategy immediately raises a first issue. Allisson and Christakis
(2006) show that the estimation of such a fixed effect logit model leads to spurious
estimates when the explanatory variables are trended. This is due to the fact that
it is not possible (by design) to observe link deletion in such data. All dyadic time
series take the form of a series of zeros followed by a one. Therefore, as suggested in
Fafchamps et al. (2010), all quantitative explanatory variables are first detrended
by assuming a linear trend (in the robustness checks, we relax this assumption by
considering other forms of trend).
A second issue concerns inference. Our observations are not independently dis-
tributed since all the observations corresponding to dyads involving the same agent
are likely to be correlated. Ignoring such correlation between observations may lead
to an inference problem. We are particularly worried about a potential overesti-
mation of coefficient significance, although the contrary may also occur. Clustering
observations on the dyads is not satisfactory since clustering should be performed
on the identities of the two members of each dyad. Cameron and Miller (2015)
suggest a two-way clustering approach by which observations are clustered on the
identity of the two persons involved. However it does not fully account for all the
correlation between observables. In particular, it does not take into consideration
the correlation between dyads that share the same agent on different “sides” of
the dyad (on the right and on the left). In this paper, we will follow previous
work by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and Cameron and Miller (2014)25 to provide
dyadic-robust standard errors estimation. We have adapted the sandwich variance
estimator of Cameron and Miller (2014) to the conditional logit model which is
estimated through maximum likelihood.26
Table 3 synthesizes our baseline regression results. We find first that, as ex-
24Fafchamps et al. (2010) use similar network controls.
25Previous work by Snijders and Borgatti (1999) should also be mentioned.
26Adaptation of their Stata code “regdyad2.ado”. In the robustness checks, we show that this
method is, as expected, more conservative (t statistics are closer to zero) than the two-way clus-
tering approach suggested by Cameron and Miller (2015).
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pected, the number of neighbors that the two agents do not have in common always
positively and significantly impacts the probability of connection. This result is
significant at the 0.1% level for the three regressions for which all 407,001 observa-
tions are available. Significance at the 5% level is obtained when we also control for
the applicant (company) characteristics, imposing a significant reduction in sample
size down to one third of its initial size. This result supports the idea that agents
benefit from indirect connections (at least at distance two) which is consistent with-
the existence of network-based knowledge spillovers. It supports the love-for-non-
redundant-connections hypothesis. This effect may seem limited as having one more
non-common friend increases the probability to connect by approximately 3% across
all specifications. However, note that agents in the dyads under investigation have
in average four-to-five non-common partners. Moreover, the standard deviation of
that variable is even slightly larger (reported in Table 1), so that a one-standard
deviation of the number of non-common friends actually increases the probability
to connect by more than 20%. Remind that such probability increase is obtained
within the dyad and while controlling for all other time-varying covariates.
Our second and main result is the following. When we do not control for the
costs of network formation (no cost variable is introduced in the model of Column
1, Table 3) or only account for technological and geographic distances (Column
2), the number of common neighbors is positively and significantly associated with
the probability of creating a link. This seems to indicate that agents like closing
triangles. However, when we properly control for omitted variables such as the
connection costs, in particular when we control for all applicant variables (Columns
3 and 4), it appears clearly that this effect disappears. Therefore, if inventors close
triangles, this is totally explained by the controls. Moreover, it turns out that the
number of common neighbors now significantly decreases the probability of becoming
connected. These results are significant at the 0.1% level for the models of columns
1 to 3, and at the 1% level for the full model of Column 4 - on the reduced sample.
This effect is strong as, according to the last specification, having one more friend
in common decreases the probability to connect by 23%. In terms of within-sample
variation, a one standard deviation in the number of non-common partners raises
the probability to connect by 16%. These results clearly speak against the love-for-
triadic-closure hypothesis.
The results appear to be globally robust to a list of alternative specifications.
All the supplementary regressions we discuss below are reported in Appendix B.
The results are robust in particular to different assumptions about the trend of the
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quantitative explaining variables: the results do not change when we assume either
a logarithmic or a quadratic trend (Tables B1 and B2). When a larger time window
(ten years) is retained to build the right-hand side networks variables (Table B3),
the results on the impact of the number of common neighbors remain the same.
However, it then appears that the number of non-common neighbors negatively
affects the probability of connecting. This could be explained by the lower influence
of (older) non-common neighbors on the probability of connecting. It could also be
due to the assumption that agents never retire or die: older agents are those most
likely to have larger neighborhoods, while they are also more likely to be no longer
active. This last remark could be interpreted as a reinforcement of our positive
result obtained for the five-year moving window networks. The divergence with the
main regressions is, however, limited since this coefficient is never significant and
very close to zero.27 Lastly, in Table B4 we report the same regression coefficients as
in Table 3, but the t statistics are obtained with two-way clustered standard errors
instead of dyadic clustered standard errors. These standard errors were computed
as suggested in Cameron and Miller (2015). As expected, these results are less
conservative in terms of inference as compared to our main results presented in
Table 3.
The impacts of the cost variables are also interesting in themselves. All the cost
variables are always significant at the 1% level,28 and the coefficients always have
the expected signs. Geographic distance and technological distance significantly de-
crease the probability of becoming connected. Having previously had one common
applicant strongly and positively affects that probability. Interestingly, if one inven-
tor has already invented for an academic applicant in the dyad, and while controlling
for individual fixed effects, the probability of forming a connection is higher, which
highlights the role of academics in creating connections among inventors.
5 Monte Carlo experiments
In this section, we explore the validity of the estimated negative effect of common
neighbors on link formation, relying on a series of Monte Carlo simulations. We
suspect that our estimates may be biased by underlying assumptions, in particular
27Moreover, this coefficient remains positive in a more complete specification in which difference
variables (between applicants in the dyad) are included. Results are not reported, but are available
from the authors.
28In fact, all the cost variables in all models but one (Jaffe technological distance in Model 3)
are significant at the 0.1% level.
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concerning the unobserved meeting process between agents which we have assumed
to be uniform.
The Monte Carlo model, further detailed in Appendix C,29 simulates network
formation according to the model presented in Section 2. At each period, non-
connected dyads meet with probability p and decide to collaborate if their dyadic
net return is positive, calculated as follows:
∆tij ≡ θij + βc
M
ηij
(
gt + ij
)
+ βncη¯ij
(
gt
)− ctij + εtij, (7)
which is a simplified version of Equation 3. βc and βnc are generative coefficients
chosen on purpose.30 Only dyads of agents who eventually collaborate are considered
for inclusion in the data table, up to their first connection, so that the dependent
variable is a time series of 0 followed by a single 1 for each dyad (as for the empirical
data estimation in Section 4). Then, we estimate the occurrence of a first connection
in a conditional Logit model on linearly detrended explanatory variables. The whole
network data generation process and the estimation are repeated 100 times so that
a distribution of estimated coefficients is obtained for each single set of generative
coefficients.
In a first set of Monte Carlo simulations, the generative coefficients βc and βnc are
calibrated using the estimated coefficients of Column 3–Table 3. The regression re-
sults obtained on those data are presented in Model 1–Table 4. The mean estimated
coefficient of common neighbors is -0.25 (SD is only 0.07) and are significant for 98
out of 100 runs. The sign is thus correctly estimated but the coefficient is about half
of its associated generative coefficient (-0.505). We suspect this downward bias in
magnitude may be due to the systematic inclusion in the sample of agent dyads for
all the periods before their first collaboration, even when they actually do not meet.
Those dyad-periods have been included to match the very nature of the empirical
data. Meetings between inventors are not directly observed as in most real network
data. Meetings are however observable in the Monte Carlo generated data allowing
us to appreciate to what extent using this information would reduce the estimation
bias. In Model 2 agents dyads are excluded for all periods they do not meet. This
significantly alleviates the downward bias as the average estimated coefficient of the
number of common neighbors is now -0.41, closer to its generative value (-0.505).
29Note that the results of this section are robust to a variation in the generating parameters, as
shown in Appendix D.
30The generative coefficient of costs is normalized to −1.
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If the underestimation of this coefficient by 50% is roughly preserved for different
generative values of βc, it is pretty straightforward to find out the generative value
which leads to estimates matching the ones obtained on real data. Setting the gen-
erative βc to -1 (nearly twice the estimated βc on the real data), we obtain estimated
coefficients that are indeed very close to the coefficients obtained from real network
data regressions (-0.53 in Model 3, vs. -0.505). Further, network generation free of
any network determinants (i.e., generative βc = βnc = 0) leads to positive estimated
coefficients (Model 5) that are significant in 71% of the regressions. Therefore, in
the absence of any network effect, spurious positive (not negative) effects of common
neighbors may be obtained. Such bias is mainly due to not observing meetings as
excluding non-meeting pairs almost completely solves the problem (the fraction of
regressions for which we obtain significant coefficients falls to 7% in Model 6, and
the mean point estimates are close to 0).
In Appendix E, the Monte Carlo procedure is used to investigate three other
potential biases. We first explore the consequence of miss identifying agents in the
data. We find that artificially adding Type 1 or Type 2 errors31 into the data has
limited consequences on the estimates. Large type 1 errors only lead to a downward
bias in magnitude of the estimated coefficients. Such errors are however controlled
and minimized by the disambiguation algorithm (see Appendix A). Secondly, we
consider a non uniform meeting process, assuming that meetings are more likely
when agents have common friends. This alternative meeting process does not bias
estimates. Thirdly, we assume agents take their decisions in continuous time, ob-
serving the current state of the network whereas estimations are performed on a
discrete time basis. The bias is also limited, decreasing slightly the magnitude of
the common neighbors estimates.
In a nutshell, none of those Monte Carlo experiments suggests that the estimated
negative effect of common neighbors could be spurious. If biased, the negative effect
of common neighbors may have only been underestimated. This reinforces our main
conclusion leading to the rejection of the love-for-triadic-closure hypothesis in our
context.
31Type 1 errors are false positives while Type 2 errors are false negatives.
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6 Conclusion
While a large number of empirical studies examine how social networks shape ag-
gregate or individual outcomes, the individual strategies that drive their evolution
are often not considered. At the same time, a growing theoretical literature explores
the properties of networks that emerge when self-interested agents strategically form
their connections (Jackson, 2009). In this paper, we contribute to a recent empirical
literature that aims to fill the gap between these two approaches by studying the
formation of links using panel data on large social networks (e.g. Fafchamps et al.,
2010; Snijders, 2017). Specifically, we examine the incentives of inventors to form
new research collaborations, with a special focus on the effect of triadic closure and
non-redundant connections which have been identified as some of the main drivers
of social network formation. We estimate the proposed incentive equation to bilat-
erally form new links using precise data on patents produced by French inventors
over the period 1978-2004 that allow us to account for time-varying co-variates and
to control for dyadic as well as individual fixed effects.
We find that two inventors are significantly less likely to form a first research col-
laboration when they have more common partners, once all the potential confound-
ing factors are properly controlled for. Our heuristic model leads us to interpret this
result as meaning that inventors are not willing to close triangles per se, and even
that they dislike doing so. A series of Monte Carlo experiments even suggest we may
underestimate this effect. It may (or may not) be limited to our particular context,
in which the institutions (mostly companies) have incentives to create the conditions
for the enforcement of cooperative behaviors between their employees. As we control
for patent applicants, we also control for the positive effect of being employed by the
same organization. In any context of application, however, this result does urge us
to control for the various potential costs and constraints borne by the agents when
testing individuals’ preferences toward forming links as a function of the existing
network connections. A second finding reveals the preferences of inventors towards
non-redundant connections. Taken together, these results indicate that connections
among socially closed agents might provide lower benefits but that the lower costs
or constraints faced to form such connections strongly encourages their formation.
This paper also contributes to the recent literature on knowledge spillovers, net-
works and invention. Several studies have shown that interpersonal networks are
crucial determinants of knowledge transmission (e.g. Singh, 2005; Breschi and Lis-
soni, 2006). Our evidence further shows that inventors preferentially form links with
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partners with whom they are not already indirectly connected. One interpretation
would be that agents prefer to form non-redundant connections to benefit from fresh
ideas and gather information from socially distant sources. Nevertheless, our results
also suggest that inventors mostly build those less fruitful collaborations within clus-
tered communities because they are less costly. In terms of innovation policy, an
implication of our findings is that the focus should be more on the communities of
individuals (rather than on companies or spatial clusters) and on subsidizing the
formation of those supposedly more efficient but costly connections that span insti-
tutional and other boundaries. Their social value is likely to be very high because
they are non-redundant, much higher than their private returns for the directly
concerned agents.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the 2004 co-invention networks built with different
assumptions about the duration of links.
cumulated 10-year window 5-year window
# isolated agents 20, 315 53, 555 73, 063
# connected agents 82, 994 49, 754 30, 246
# links 161, 724 92, 756 51, 763
# of components 10, 198 7, 104 5, 586
largest component size 51, 761 24, 744 7, 357
2nd largest component size 82 153 130
av. degree (all agents) 3.13 1.80 1.00
av. degree (connected agent) 3.89 3.74 3.42
av. clustering 0.53 0.57 0.59
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the dyads that are formed at some point, observed
from the year the two agents are considered as active, until the year the link is
formed (included).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
network common 0.11 0.73 407,001
variables non-common 4.73 6.79 407,001
geo distance 265.91 395.83 407,001
cost Jaffe tech distance 0.49 0.46 407,001
variables public research 0.11 0.32 407,001
common applicant 0.16 0.37 407,001
cpny researchers 819.66 1635.14 154,535
RD dpt size 1912.3 3355.97 154,535
applicant controls internal RD 216,785.65 588,788.08 154,535
(sum in the dyad) external RD 52,692.32 139,987.39 147,743
cpny size 19,212.2 55,975.64 154,535
cpny turnover 1,994,384.71 8,439,402 154,535
diff. cpny researchers 0.18 0.35 129,133
diff. RD dpt size 0.18 0.36 129,133
applicant controls diff. internal RD 0.18 0.35 129,133
(difference in the dyad) diff. external RD 0.21 0.38 111,472
diff. cpny size 0.18 0.35 129,120
diff. cpny turnover 0.2 0.37 119,898
av. productivity 0.38 0.44 407,001
net controls diff. in degree 0.64 0.45 407,001
diff. in productivity 0.71 0.39 407,001
31
Figure 2: Distribution of first connections according to the geographic distance (in
km) between the connected agents.
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Table 3: Conditional logit on the occurrence of the first connection, all sample,
five-year window network, linear detrending.
1 2 3 4
non-common 0.0321*** 0.0328*** 0.0276** 0.0313*
(4.26) (4.33) (2.35) (2.01)
common 0.199*** 0.204*** -0.529*** -0.255**
(10.34) (9.47) (-4.31) (-2.79)
geo distance -0.00132*** -0.00143*** -0.000621***
(-24.70) (-25.15) (-6.52)
Jaffe tech distance -0.339*** -0.258** -0.507***
(-5.18) (-2.77) (-3.30)
public research 23.13*** 21.83***
(84.67) (1312.63)
common applicant 31.71*** 24.75***
(8.30) (133.39)
network controls yes yes yes yes
applicant controls no no no yes
observations 407,001 407,001 407,001 129,924
Notes: Dyadic clustered standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
Significance levels: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Table 4: Estimated coefficients of the number of non common neighbors on the
probability to collaborate from given Monte Carlo simulations.
Generative Estimated coefficients
Values Full sample Excl. Non-Meeting Pairs
βc = −0.53 Model 1 Model 2
Mean S.D. # signif. Mean S.D. # signif.
-0.25 0.073 98 -0.41 0.204 48
βc = −1
Model 3 Model 4
Mean S.D. # signif. Mean S.D. # signif.
-0.656 0.112 100 -0.989 0.241 99
βc = 0
Model 5 Model 6
Mean S.D. # signif. Mean S.D. # signif.
0.189 0.0887 71 0.0849 0.347 7
Notes: The table reports the means and standard-deviations of the coefficient estimates
βc from 100 conditional logit estimations obtained. The column # signif. reports the
number of times the coefficient is significant at the 5% level. In Models 1 to 4, the
generative coefficient for βnc is fixed to 0.028. In Models 5 and 6, it is kept to 0, as βc. In
Model 2, 4 and 6, the non meeting dyads a given year are excluded from the sample. All
explaining variables are linearly detrended.
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Appendix A: A Bayesian methodology to disam-
biguate inventors’ names.
In this Appendix, we present the basic features of a Bayesian methodology for
estimating the probability that two ex ante different identities correspond to the
same person, given a series of observables provided by the data.32 This methodology
has been presented much more extensively in a technical note authored by two of
us (Carayol and Cassi, 2009). In the second section of this appendix, we show how
this methodology applies to the disambiguation of patent inventors. We also briefly
present the results we obtain on an actualized data set of French inventors. Other
methodologies have been developed and applied on patent data in recent works,
such as Trajtenberg et al. (2006), Pezzoni et al. (2014) or Li et al. (2014).
Methodology
According to Raffo and Lhuillery (2009), any procedure of disambiguation should
be performed in three stages i) a parsing stage, finalized in the standardization and
cleaning of different data set fields; ii) a matching stage, where different algorithms
could be used to group homonyms; iii) a filtering stage, where different sets of
information (i.e. observable attributes already listed in patent data sets such as, for
instance, technological class) are used to give a similarity score in order to determine
whether homonyms refer to the same person. If the two first steps are essentially
technical, the third one requires non-trivial methodological issues to be solved. Here,
we focus on this third step, since the first two have already been treated. Basically,
it consists in establishing criteria for assigning similarity scores between homonyms.
Let us first consider a list I of ex ante agents i defined in the most disaggregated
way possible. Each ex ante agent i is characterized by a series of K variables33
labeled Xk, with k = 1, ..., K. The main goal of the methodology proposed here
is to provide an estimation of the probability that any ex ante agent i is the same
person as some other ex ante agent j. In short, we are in search of the partition
pi = {C1, ..., Cm} of I, the m elements of which should correspond to the correct ex
post identities. We note {i, j} ⊂ Ch,∀h = 1, ...,m by writing “i = j”.
In order to assess the probability of that event, we must rely on observables of
32Though this methodology has been developed for inventors in patent data, it can be applied
to other similarly structured data.
33See Table A1 below to have the list of variables we use here.
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agents i and j, that is the observed realizations xki and x
k
j of random variablesX
k
i and
Xkj for all k = 1, ..., K and their respective frequencies of occurrence. These variables
are assumed to be independent across agents (∀k, k′ = 1, ..., K,∀i 6= j :Xki ⊥Xkj ) and
∀k = 1, ..., K;∀i, j, Xki and Xkj have the same support (by construction). Without
loss of generality, let us assume that we observe xki = x
k
j , for all k = 1, ..., k¯ − 1 and
xk
′
i 6= xk′j for all k′ = k¯,..., K. One may think of j as an identity which first appears
in the data, and then a new identity i appears and one wants to check whether i and
j identities correspond to the same person. We have some information on j and i
from which we can use. In short, we would like to estimate the following conditional
probability:
Pr
(
i = j
∣∣∣Xki = xkj ,∀k = 1, ..., k¯ − 1 and Xk′i 6= xk′j ,∀k′ = k¯, ..., K) . (8)
In principle, it could be possible to apply Bayes’ rule to calculate (8). Applying
Bayes rule, the probability in (8) is equal to
Pr(i = j)× Pr (Xki = xkj ,∀k = 1, ..., k¯ − 1 and Xk′i 6= xk′j , ∀k′ = k¯, ..., K |i = j )
Pr
(
Xki = x
k
j ,∀k = 1, ..., k¯ − 1 and Xk′i 6= xk′j , ∀k′ = k¯, ..., K
) .
(9)
However, it is not possible to compute Pr(i = j), and thus it is not possible to com-
pute the conditional probability using Bayes’ rule. One way to avoid this difficulty is
to focus on the similarity score ∆ (i, j), defined as follows. It is the probability that
i = j, knowing that indeed Xki = x
k
j ,∀k = 1, ..., k¯ − 1, divided by the probability
that i = j, knowing that Xk
′
i 6= xk′j ,∀k′ = 1, ..., k¯ − 1, all other things remaining
the same. This differentiates out Pr(i = j). If we make the additional simplifying
assumption that the different variables are independent for any given agent across
agents (∀k, k′ = 1, ..., K,∀i :Xki ⊥Xk′j ),34 it can be shown that the similarity score is
equal to:
∆ (i, j) = Πk=1,...k¯−1
(
1− εk)
εk
× Ωk (i, j) , (10)
where εk ≡ Pr (Xki 6= xkj |i = j ) is the probability that any individual changes kth,
observable between two invention occurrences, and where Ωk (i, j) ≡(1− Pr (Xki = xkj ))/
Pr
(
Xki = x
k
j
)
, that is the probability that the two ex ante agents i and j have a
34This assumption is made for simplifying the exposition only. If, for instance, the correlation
of the Xki with X
k′
i variables (for all i) had to be considered, we would just have to consider the
probability of jointly observing Xki = x
k
j and X
k′
i = x
k′
j . Then, it is more a matter of computation.
As it is shown below, in this disambiguation exercise, there is no need to introduce this since the
results are already very good.
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different kth observable divided by the reverse (irrespective of the fact that they are
or are not the same persons ex post). The latter term accounts for the frequency
of occurrence of the observables (xkj through Ω
k (i, j) in Equation (10)). As will
be shown in the next section, these two probabilities εk and Ωk can be estimated
iteratively.
At this point, let us assume that we know the relevant threshold value ∆¯ for the
similarity score below which two ex ante agents should be considered as different
agents, and above which they should be considered as being the same person.35
Then, a transitivity issue arises. For instance, consider three ex ante agents z, w
and h and ∆ (h,w) < ∆¯ < ∆ (z, h) < ∆ (z, w). In this situation, ex ante agents
z and w will ex post be considered as referring to the same person. The same
applies to z and h. If these two statements hold true, h and w should also be the
same person ex post by transitivity, even though their similarity score is below the
threshold value. We thus need to modify the values of ∆ (h,w) so as to take into
account the transitivity of identities. To do so, an algorithm is proposed in order to
modify the values of ∆ (i, j) .
Algorithm
For all considered pairs of distinct ex ante agents i and j, we apply:
∆ (i, j)←↩ max
(
∆(i, j); max
k∈I\{i,j}
min(∆(i, h); ∆(j, h))
)
recursively until one can not find any triplet of distinct ex ante agents h, i, j ∈ I,
such that:
∆(i, j) < min (∆(i, h); ∆(j, h)) .
Data, estimation and results
Our empirical evidence is built upon all European Patent Applications for which
at least one inventor has declared an address in France, with a patent priority
date between January 1978 and December 2005. All non-French inventors of these
patents have been deleted. The data set counts 136, 285 patents and 266, 724
inventor×patent occurrences. At this stage, the total number of ex ante agents cor-
responds to all the inventor×patent occurrences that can be observed (for instance
35We show in the next section how we make use of a benchmark sample to compute this threshold.
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Pierre Dupont/Patent X; Pierre Dupont/ Patent Y; Olivier Dupuy/Patent Y and
so on). This represents our list of ex-ante inventors, I. The variables used for com-
puting similarity scores are presented in Table A1.
Table A1: The variables used to build the similarity scores.
Variables
X1 : name & first name
X2 : assignee
X3 : city
X4 : IPC (6 digits)
X5 : citation link
The name, first name and full address information are initially used to obtain
a starting partition of agents noted pi0. Since full address information is used, we
certainly minimize incorrect aggregations.36 This partitioning generates an initial
evolution of the set of agents, reduced to 126,887 inventors. This evolution allows us
to compute initial conditional probabilities εk. However, the εk are underestimated
here since the identities are not yet sufficiently aggregated, and we thus encounter
the risk of abusive aggregations of agents. Therefore, we propose to process identities
recursively, which allows us to progressively determine both the identities and the εk.
The first similarity scores are computed for the 1,074,946 couples of agents, taken
from the previous step, with the same name and first name.37 A precautionary
conservative rule is arbitrarily adopted at this step: a high value is given to the
threshold ∆¯ which defines, after having applied the transitivity algorithm, a new
partition pi1. Then, at each stage t ≥ 2, the partition obtained from the previous
period pit is considered, and new conditional probabilities εk, new similarity scores
36The full string, reporting the city and street address, is considered. The probability of two
different persons with the same name and first name having the same address (i.e. living in the
same building) can reasonably be assumed to be equal to zero. However, it may happen that the
company address is reported as the inventor’s personal address. Such cases were checked in the
data and treated separately.
37Without relying on the location data at this stage, because addresses were used in defining the
identities so that the probability of moving is null here by assumption.
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and a new threshold ∆¯ are computed. All pairs of agents whose similarity score
is above the threshold are aggregated within the elements of pit+1. That partition
defines a new population of agents taken as an input in the next iteration. This
process is repeated until it converges to an equilibrium partition, pi∗, which will
constitute the final set of inventors.
Fixing the value of the threshold ∆¯ is obviously a key issue which deserves careful
attention. In order to determine this threshold, we rely on a benchmark data set.
A list of French faculty members was matched with the patent data set on the basis
of the name and first name of their inventors. Checks on the internet and phone
calls to the faculty members were made in order to verify that they are the inventors
of patents when their first name and name are mentioned therein. In all, reliable
information was collected on 445 French scholars.38 Their positive and negative
declarations have been transformed into assertions on the fact that an ex ante agent
i and another agent j who have the same name and first name refer to the same
person. In all, we have 4, 989 assertions, 4, 567 of which are positive and 422 are
negative. This sample of positive and negative couples of agent identities is used as
a reliable benchmark to select the appropriate value of the threshold in the interim
stages. For each threshold value chosen, the share of Type 1 (false positive) errors
1 and the share of Type 2 (false negative) errors 2 in the benchmark are computed,
as well as any linear combinations of these two values: φ (θ) = θ1 + (1− θ) 2, with
θ ∈ [0, 1] , which accounts for any given weighting schemes of the two types of errors.
A threshold that would minimize φ (θ) for some θ is noted ∆¯ (θ). On our data set,
it appears that fixing the threshold equal to ∆¯ = exp (12.49) minimizes φ (θ) for a
wide range of θ, between 0.09 and 0.64, and thus this is the chosen value for the
threshold.
Finally, the algorithm converges after four iterations towards a final population
of 105,086 French inventors. Restricting ourselves to the period 1978-2004, we have
103,309 inventors.39 The benchmark can also be used to assess the quality of the
terminal results. If the most appropriate weighting scheme is θ = .1,40 the weighted
38We are indebted to the KEINS project and BETA at the University of Strasbourg for kindly
allowing us to use these data.
39It should be worth noting that, in order to solve the issue of homonymy between inventors,
we make use of all the data available to us (i.e. 1978-2005). Nevertheless, since the data for the
last year (2005) is not complete, we exclude it from our analysis of the co-invention network in the
article.
40It is indeed our preferred value because it avoids abusive aggregation of agents. Note that this
preference does not constraint the disambiguation algorithm since the chosen threshold value for
the similarity score is minimizing errors for a large and reasonable set of values of θ.
39
share of errors obtained is φ (.1) = 1.81%, which remains very low.
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Appendix B: Robustness check regressions
Table B1: Conditional logit on the occurrence of the first connection, five-year
window network, log detrending.
1 2 3 4
non-common 0.0322*** 0.0329*** 0.0277** 0.0314*
(4.28) (4.34) (2.36) (2.01)
common 0.199*** 0.204*** -0.527*** -0.254**
(10.37) (9.50) (-4.31) (-2.78)
geo distance -0.00132*** -0.00143*** -0.000623***
(-24.72) (-25.17) (-6.45)
Jaffe tech distance -0.340*** -0.260** -0.509***
(-5.20) (-2.79) (-3.32)
public research 22.63*** 21.83***
(27.39) (33.16)
common applicant 31.02*** 24.75***
(8.15) (135.85)
network controls yes yes yes yes
applicant controls no no no yes
observations 407,001 407,001 407,001 129,924
Notes: Dyadic clustered standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
Significance levels: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Table B2: Conditional logit on the occurrence of the first connection, five-year
window network, quadratic detrending.
1 2 3 4
non-common 0.0320*** 0.0327*** 0.0275** 0.0312*
(4.24) (4.31) (2.34) (1.98)
common 0.198*** 0.203*** -0.531*** -0.256**
(10.31) (9.44) (-4.31) (-2.76)
geo distance -0.00132*** -0.00143*** -0.000620***
(-24.68) (-25.14) (-6.47)
Jaffe tech distance -0.338*** -0.256** -0.505***
(-5.15) (-2.75) (-3.29)
public research 23.13*** 21.83***
(22.95) (725.74)
common applicant 31.76*** 24.76***
(8.26) (138.67)
network controls yes yes yes yes
applicant controls no no no yes
observations 407,001 407,001 407,001 129,924
Notes: Dyadic clustered standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
Significance levels: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Table B3: Conditional logit on the occurrence of the first connection, ten-year
window network, linear detrending.
1 2 3 4
non-common -0.00998 -0.00841 -0.00991 -0.00398
(-0.68) (-0.57) (-0.46) (-0.16)
common 0.115*** 0.121*** -0.686*** -0.418***
(5.33) (4.92) (-4.29) (-3.29)
geo distance -0.00122*** -0.00132*** -0.000536***
(-21.54) (-22.47) (-5.43)
Jaffe tech distance -0.00122*** -0.00132*** -0.000536***
(-5.11) (-2.90) (-3.03)
public research 23.22*** 22.15***
(438.72) (1470.51)
common applicant 35.82*** 25.50***
(7.02) (74.01)
network controls yes yes yes yes
applicant controls no no no yes
observations 347,707 347,707 347,707 118,839
Notes: Dyadic clustered standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
Significance levels: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
The observations before year 1988 were dropped to obtain a consistent ten-year window
for each year considered.
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Table B4: Conditional logit on the occurrence of the first connection, five-year
window network, linear detrending, with the two-way clustered standard errors
1 2 3 4
non-common 0.0321*** 0.0328*** 0.0276** 0.0313**
(5.04) (5.15) (2.73) (2.40)
common 0.199*** 0.204*** -0.529*** -0.255***
(10.67) (10.86) (-5.09) (-3.19)
geo distance -0.00132*** -0.00143*** -0.000621***
(-28.14) (-28.22) (-7.24)
Jaffe tech distance -0.339*** -0.258*** -0.507***
(-5.28) (-3.16) (-3.79)
public research 23.13*** 21.83***
(113.25) (54.27)
common applicant 31.71*** 24.75***
(9.72) (147.829)
network controls yes yes yes yes
applicant controls no no no yes
observations 407,001 407,001 407,001 129,924
Notes: Dyadic clustered standard errors (t statistics in parentheses).
Significance levels: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Appendix C: Network generation for the Monte
Carlo experiments
Data are generated according to the theoretical model over 30 periods. One thousand
agents are initially introduced and fifty new agents are added each period. Agents
meet at random with a probability p = 0.05, and decide to form a link if ∆ij (t) > 0,
with ∆ij (t) defined in Equation 3. The network statistics are computed on the links
that have been created between periods t − 5 and t − 1, consistently with the real
data as network statistics are computed over the five previous years. The random
term εtij is drawn from a centered Logistic distribution of unitary scale. The pair
fixed-effect is defined as θij = γi + γj + ξij, where γi and γj are specific to the agents
and drawn from a Poisson law of mean λγ = 2, and where ξij is specific to the pair
and drawn from a Poisson law of mean λξ = 11. Each time varying cost variable ctij
is drawn at from a Poisson law of parameter λc = 23. λc is greater than λξ + 2λγ
so that on average the costs are higher than the benefits (i.e. E(∆tij) < 0), meaning
that it requires several meetings (on average) before getting connected.
At each period, the network evolves as follows:
1. Meeting step: Each non-connected pair of agents is selected with probability
p.
2. Decision step: For each selected pair of agents, we
• Compute the network statistics η¯ij (gt) and
4
η ij (g
t),
• Generate the cost value ctij and the error εtij,
• Compute ∆ij(t),
• Create a link if ∆ij(t) > 0.
3. Entry step: 50 new agents enter the network.
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Appendix D: Monte Carlo simulations with vary-
ing network generation parameters
We replicate the Monte Carlo simulations reported in Section 5 for different values
of the generating parameters λξ and λc. More precisely, we let the mean cost and the
mean dyad fixed effect vary across a grid. We reduce and increase by 1 the values of
the two parameters, thus replicating the MC simulations nine times. The different
parameters lead to different expected probabilities to collaborate upon meeting.
In Table 5, we report these expected probabilities and number of meetings prior
collaboration, when two agents have no common nor non-common neighbors. In the
baseline, the expected probability to collaborate upon meeting equals 11%. This
means agents need to meet 9.5 times on average before a collaboration occurs. Both
reducing the mean cost and augmenting the mean dyad fixed-effect by one increases
collaboration probability upon meeting up to 18%, that is agents need to meet only
5.7 in average times before collaborating.
Table 5: Consequence of parameters variation: Expected probability to collaborate
and expected number of meetings before collaboration.
Expected Expected number of meetings
probability to collaborate before collaboration
λξ − 1 λξ λξ + 1 λξ − 1 λξ λξ + 1
λc − 1 0.1 0.13 0.18 λc − 1 10 7.4 5.7
λc 0.076 0.11 0.14 λc 13.2 9.5 7.1
λc + 1 0.059 0.082 0.11 λc + 1 17 12.2 8.9
Notes: The expected number of meetings before a collaboration takes place is computed as
1+(1− p) /p with p the expected probability to collaborate. To obtain these probabilities,
we generated 100,000 times the value of ∆ij = (γi + γj + ξij) − ctij + tij and computed
the average of 1 {∆ij > 0}. With: γi ∼ Poisson (2), γj ∼ Poisson (2), ξij ∼ Poisson (x),
x ∈ {λξ − 1, λξ, λξ + 1}, costij ∼ Poisson (t), t ∈ {λc − 1, λc, λc + 1}, λξ = 11, λc = 23
and εtij ∼ Logit (1).
The distribution of estimated βc from 100 conditional logit estimations for each
variant of network costs and benefits, and with the same generative values of the
network determinants than in Model 3-Table 4 are reported in Figure 3. Over-
all, patterns are very close to what is obtained in Section 5, exhibiting a similar
downward bias in magnitude for βc.
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Figure 3: Distribution of estimates obtained with different values of the parameters.
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Notes: The figure reports the distribution of the coefficient estimates βc from 100 con-
ditional logit estimations obtained, when γi ∼ Poisson (2), γj ∼ Poisson (2), ξij ∼
Poisson (x), x ∈ {λξ − 1, λξ, λξ + 1}, costij ∼ Poisson (t), t ∈ {λc − 1, λc, λc + 1},
λξ = 11, λc = 23 and εtij ∼ Logit (1). The generative coefficient for βnc is fixed to
0.028 and the generative coefficient for βc is −1.
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Appendix E: Further Monte Carlo simulations
Errors in individuals identification
Dealing with individual data extracted from name registers, we had to play a “name
game” described in Appendix A. Though we know identification errors are very
limited, still the data suffer from some lack of precision (due to Type 1 errors) and
recall (due to Type 2 errors). To appreciate the impact of such errors, we inject both
types of errors in the simulated data before estimation. Type 1 errors are introduced
by selecting randomly a fraction of individual IDs and merging each with another
randomly drawn ID. Type 2 errors are introduced by splitting randomly chosen
agents in two and each of their collaboration is then randomly assigned to one of
the two “fake” agents. Though the network forms on the basis of real identities,
network statistics and regressions are computed on data where IDs errors have been
included. The results are reported in Table 6. All estimated common neighbors
coefficients are very close to the ones of Model 3–Table 4. The largest difference is
observed when a large fraction of Type 1 errors are introduced. Here the average of
the estimated coefficients of common neighbors is significantly reduced in magnitude
to a value of -0.40.
Table 6: Estimated coefficients obtained from 100 Monte Carlo simulations: Differ-
ent ways to generate the data.
Generative Estimated Coefficients
Value Type 1 errors Type 2 errors Alternative Continuous
1% 10% 1% 10% Meeting Updating
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
βc = −1 Mean -0.619 -0.397 -0.657 -0.656 -0.646 -0.564
S.D. 0.112 0.0896 0.113 0.112 0.082 0.0903
Notes: The table reports the means and standard-deviations of the coefficient estimates
from 100 conditional logit estimations. The data for each of these estimations consist in
100 different networks. The generative coefficient for βnc is fixed to 0.028. The coefficient
is significant at the 5% level in all regressions.
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Alternative meeting process
In the baseline model, agents meet at random. We investigate the consequence of
introducing an alternative meeting process in which ex ante connected agents in a
“friendship network” are more likely to meet. When connected in this friendship net-
work, agents are four times more likely to meet. The friendship network is assumed
to be a small world created from a L1 lattice with degree 6, and a 10% rewiring
probability. The results of the MC simulations are reported in Model 5–Table 6 and
show estimated coefficients similar to the ones of Model 3-Table 4.
Continuous time
In the baseline model, all individuals take decisions at discrete points of time. To
investigate the consequences of introducing continuous time, we assume that in-
stead of all agents making their decisions simultaneously in one given period, now
dyads make collaboration decisions sequentially as in a continuous time updating
of the network. MC results are reported in Model 6–Table 6 where we see that the
coefficient of common neighbors is slightly lower in magnitude than the coefficient
of Model 3-Table 4. This implies that in the presence of continuous updating, the
empirical methodology would still be able to detect the negative effect of common
neighbors. Further, the continuous updating acts simply as adding further “noise”
in the estimation.
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